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REPLY TO ADAMS AND CLARKE 
Tristan HAZE 
 
ABSTRACT: Here I defend two counterexamples to Nozick’s truth-tracking 
theory of knowledge from an attack on them by Adams and Clarke. With respect 
to the first counterexample, Adams and Clarke make the error of judging that my 
belief counts as knowledge. More demonstrably, with respect to the second 
counterexample they make the error of thinking that, on Nozick's method-
relativized theory, the method M in question in any given case must be generally 
reliable. 
KEYWORDS: knowledge, truth-tracking, counterexamples 
 
In a recent paper1 I put forward two counterexamples to Nozick's truth-tracking 
theory of knowledge. I claimed that these work against Nozick's simple truth-
tracking account, the method-relativized version of his truth-tracking account, 
and a recent modification of the account due to Briggs and Nolan,2 on which 
counterfactuals are replaced with dispositional claims. In a discussion note in this 
journal,3 Adams and Clarke have argued that both of my counterexamples fail.4 
                                                                
1 Tristan Haze, “Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge,” 
Logos & Episteme VI, 3 (2015): 309-311. 
2 Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan, “Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know,” Analysis 72, 2 (2012): 
314-316. 
3 Fred Adams and Murray Clarke, “Two Non-Counterexamples to Truth-Tracking Theories of 
Knowledge,” Logos & Episteme VII, 1 (2016): 67-73. 
4 An incidental clarification about scope: potentially misleadingly, Adams and Clarke claim that 
my counterexamples are aimed 'at tracking theories generally' (Adams and Clarke, “Two Non-
Counterexamples,” 67). In keeping with this, they consider, as an afterthought, my 
counterexamples with respect to an account due to Dretske. To be clear: in my title and my first 
sentence, I use the phrase 'the truth-tracking theory of knowledge' to designate my target. In 
my last sentence, I use the phrase 'this tired old theory' to designate the same. The idea here, 
adopted for expository convenience in the title and opening and closing sentences, was that 
there is a theory, Nozick's theory, which comes in two or perhaps three versions: Nozick's 
simple version, his method-relativized version, and perhaps the modified dispositional account 
of Briggs and Nolan. In the body of the paper, I am more specific: I claim, of each of these three 
versions, that my counterexamples work against them, and I make no other comparable claims 
about other versions or accounts. So I should not be read as claiming that my counterexamples 
work against any account other than these three. 
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I believe that Adams and Clarke have made two important errors. With 
respect to my first counterexample, they make the error of judging that my belief 
does indeed count as knowledge. With respect to my second counterexample (and 
this also appears in their discussion of my first counterexample) they make the 
error of holding that, on Nozick's method-relativized theory, the method M in 
question in any given case must be generally reliable. They have in effect adopted 
a different theory of knowledge, one which I make no claim to be able to refute, 
and proceeded as if this is Nozick's method-relativized theory. 
The First Error 
Here is my first counterexample: 
I have a deep-seated, counterfactually robust delusional belief that my neighbour 
is a divine oracle. He is actually a very reliable and truthful tax-lawyer. There is a 
point about tax law he has always wanted to tell me, p. One day, he tells me that 
p, and I believe him, because I believe he is a divine oracle. I would never believe 
him if I knew he was a lawyer, being very distrustful of lawyers.5 
Regarding this, Adams and Clarke write: 
Of course, if the delusion is only about whether or not the neighbor is a lawyer, 
and not about anything the neighbor says to Haze about tax law, then the 
delusion does not infect Haze's belief-forming methods about propositions 
uttered by the neighbor. In that case, given the reliable testimony of the 
neighbor and the reliability of Haze's hearing and understanding what the 
neighbor says and his belief forming method of trusting what the neighbor says 
about tax law, we fail to see why Haze would not know that p. His belief forming 
methods about what the neighbor says about tax law are delusion-free. So his 
beliefs about tax law track the truth and Nozick's theory yields the result that 
Haze knows that p. We see this as the right result and not a counterexample to 
Nozick.6  
Firstly, the assumption that they make is right: in the example as I intended 
it, the main delusion I have is that my neighbour is not a lawyer but a divine 
oracle. I was not imagining myself to have delusions concerning the issue of what 
my neighbour has and has not said to me. 
So, Adams and Clark seem to understand my example correctly here, but 
maintain that in it, I do know that p. I think this is the wrong verdict. After all, if 
my delusion were removed, I would lose my belief that p.  
                                                                
5 Haze, “Two New Counterexamples,” 310. 
6 Adams and Clarke, “Two Non-Counterexamples,” 68. 
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It occurs to me that perhaps this counterexample should have been more 
fully specified. If we imagine the origin of my belief to have been forgotten by me, 
so that it becomes mere history, then perhaps I could be said to know that p. But 
as I am imagining it, the stuff about my neighbour being a divine oracle is fresh in 
my mind and I think of it with wonder every time I think of p. 
I do not know what more to say in support of my view here, so I will leave 
it at that and just hope that you agree with me about this. 
The Second Error 
Here there is more to say. I think I can argue conclusively that this second 
error is an error. For easy reference, here is the core part of Nozick's method-
relativized theory of knowledge – his account of knowing-via-a-method:7 
S knows, via method (or way of believing) M, that p iff  
1. p is true  
2. S believes, via method or way of coming to believe M, that p 
3. If p weren’t true, and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) p, 
then S wouldn’t believe, via M, that p  
4. If p were true, and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) p, 
then S would believe, via M, that p. 
And here is my second counterexample: 
My neighbour is a tax lawyer. Here, unlike in the previous counterexample, I 
have no delusional belief. It is my neighbour who is the strange one: for years, he 
has intently nurtured an eccentric plan to get me to believe the truth about 
whether p, where p is a true proposition of tax law, along with five false 
propositions about tax law. His intention to do this is very counterfactually 
robust. He moves in next door and slowly wins my trust. One day, he begins to 
regale me with points of tax law. He asserts six propositions: p and five false ones. 
I believe them all.8 
                                                                
7 This time I use the exact wording of Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), 179. Adams and Clarke point out that, in my original article, I 
departed slightly from Nozick's formulation. The differences were as follows: I had 'knowing' in 
place of the occurrence of 'believing' before the 'iff', did not include 'or way of coming to 
believe' in condition (2), and did not include 'then' in condition (4). None of these differences 
were introduced for any philosophical reason, and none of them would have made my 
counterexamples seem more plausible than they are. 
8 Haze, “Two New Counterexamples,” 310. 
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First of all, I want to clear up a potentially distracting mistake on the part of 
Adams and Clarke as to what caused me to think this is a counterexample. They 
write: 
We think the reason Haze believes this is a counterexample is because he 
relativizes the method M to the neighbor and the neighbor's dispensing of 
information and not to Haze's own belief-forming methods. Haze seems to think 
the method here is that with respect to the true proposition p, the neighbor 
would not say "p" unless p. This causes Haze to think Nozick's tracking 
conditions are satisfied and that Nozick's theory implies that Haze knows that p. 
However, this is not the case. (…) Nozick is very clear that methods are the 
belief-forming methods of the cognizer. (…) Haze's method M in the example is 
to trust what the neighbor says.9  
Adams and Clarke have made a wrong conjecture here. I agree that the 
method M in the example is to trust what the neighbour says – that is exactly how 
I thought of it when I came up with the counterexample. I do think the tracking 
conditions are satisfied, but not because I have some idea of what the method M is 
which differs from Adams and Clarke's idea of what the method M is. 
Now, this leads us into Adams and Clarke's argument that this 
counterexample fails. Immediately after the above quoted passage, they continue: 
And this method clearly does not track the truth because it is not restricted to "p" 
alone, but freely ranges over the other five falsehoods the neighbor utters and 
Haze believes. So this too, when properly understood, does not constitute a 
counterexample to Nozick's tracking theory.10 
The first thing to note about this argument is that it does not refer explicitly 
to any of Nozick's four conditions for knowledge-via-a-method. Nowhere do 
Adams and Clarke specify, by engaging explicitly with Nozick's theory as 
formulated in four conditions, why this example, according to them, fails to count 
as knowledge on that theory. 
The second thing to note is that Nozick's account nowhere requires that the 
method M in question in a given case track the truth, where tracking the truth is 
something like general reliability.11 I agree that, in this example, the method in 
                                                                
9 Adams and Clarke, “Two Non-Counterexamples,” 69. 
10 Adams and Clarke, “Two Non-Counterexamples,” 69. 
11 The heuristic talk of 'tracking the truth', which does not appear at all in Nozick's official 
account, is correctly applied as follows: Nozick's account of when a subject S knows a 
proposition p via method M requires S's belief that p to track the truth. Perhaps this is also OK: 
the account requires that the method M, when used by S, tracks the truth with respect to p. On 
the other hand, we cannot properly say: the account requires that the method M tracks the 
truth in general. That is a mischaracterization of Nozick's theory. 
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question – trusting what my neighbour says – is not generally reliable. But that 
doesn't stop Nozick's conditions from being fulfilled, for the conditions do not 
require general reliability of method. 
Regarding conditions (1) and (2), there is no disagreement here between me 
and Adams and Clarke. In my example, p is true, and I believe it via the method of 
trusting what my neighbour says. Condition (3) is satisfied: if p weren’t true, and I 
were to use the method of trusting what my neighbour says to arrive at a belief as 
to whether (or not) p, I would not believe, via the method of trusting what my 
neighbour says, that p. As I stipulated in describing the counterexample, my 
neighbour’s desire to have me believe the truth about p is very counterfactually 
robust. For the same reason, (4) is satisfied as well. 
It is as though Adams and Clarke are misreading conditions (3) and (4), such 
that they are taking occurrences of 'p' in them as occurrences of a separate 
variable from that which the occurrences of 'p' on the left hand side of the 
analysis, and in (1) and (2), are occurrences of. That is, it is as though they are 
reading conditions (3) and (4) as together saying that, for a subject S to know a 
proposition p via method M, method M must be such that, for all propositions q, 
the subject S whose knowledge of p is in question would, if they used M to arrive 
at a belief whether (or not) q, believe q via M iff q were true. In other words, that 
the method M be generally reliable (for the subject S in question). 
This is plainly not what conditions (3) and (4) mean. The occurrences of 'p' 
in (3) and (4) and the occurrences elsewhere are occurrences of the same variable. 
Given a subject S and a proposition p, what conditions (3) and (4) require in order 
for S to know p may be summed up as follows: the method in question M, as used 
by S, must be reliable with respect to p. 
Adams and Clarke are free to advance a theory according to which, for a 
subject S to know p via method M, method M must be generally reliable. But 
Nozick's theory simply does not require this. Neither does the modified version of 
it due to Briggs and Nolan. My second counterexample stands.12 
                                                                
12 Thanks to Peter Baumann and Neil Sinhababu for helpful correspondence. 
